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1. Introduction
Over the past fifteen years, the Nonstandard Profit Function (NSPF) approach of Humphrey
and Pulley (1997) has become the dominant method to estimate profit efficiency in banking.2
In this paper, we show that the NSPF econometric model used in the empirical literature is mis-
specified and may yield misleading results. Based on Humphrey and Pulley’s framework, we
propose an alternative method that solves this misspecification problem and makes explicit the
conditions under which NSPF efficiency measures capture both revenue and cost efficiencies.
Our paper contributes to the banking literature by providing new evidence on profit effi-
ciency of U.S. commercial banks and its relation with revenue and cost efficiencies based on
our proposed alternative method. Our findings suggest that cost inefficiency weighs more than
revenue inefficiency in estimated banks’ profit efficiency. Combined annual losses for all U.S.
commercial banks due to cost and revenue inefficiencies represent about $31.5 and $23.5 bil-
lion, respectively. However, for any given efficiency level, profit efficiency responds more to
revenue efficiency changes than to cost efficiency changes. This helps explaining our finding
that, on average, banks tend to be more revenue than cost efficient.
Using our alternative method to measure banks’ profit efficiency, we find that while rev-
enue and cost efficiencies tend to be negatively correlated, both correlate positively with profit
efficiency. In contrast, using the misspecified econometric model, profit and cost efficiencies
tend to be negatively correlated, a result for which researchers have no compelling arguments
(e.g., Rogers 1998 and Berger and Mester 1997).
Since Humphrey and Pulley’s publication, more than fifty published empirical studies have
adopted the NSPF approach to investigate different issues in banking such as bank performance,
bank productivity, deregulation, competition, market power, bank size, and cross-country com-
parisons. In contrast, only one study uses the standard neoclassical profit function (Kumbhakar,
Lozano-Vivas, Lovell, and Hasan, 2001) and two others use it only for comparison purposes
(Berger and Mester, 1997 and Vivas, 1997).
Proponents of the NSPF approach argue that the neoclassical assumption of perfect compet-
2The NSPF is also known as the alternative profit function. We use the acronym NSPF to contrast it to the
standard neoclassical profit function.
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itive markets is unsuitable for the banking industry (e.g., Berger, Humphrey, and Pulley, 1996;
Humphrey and Pulley, 1997, and Berger and Mester, 1997). In particular, Humphrey and Pul-
ley argue that banks may have more flexibility in choosing output prices than output quantities.
Further, Berger and Mester maintain that the NSPF is more appropriate for modeling banks’
maximizing behavior. The widespread use of the NSPF supports their arguments.
In the NSPF framework, banks maximize profits choosing output prices and input quantities
while taking input prices and output quantities as given. The solution of the maximization
problem yields the NSPF which is a function of input prices and output quantities. To estimate
profit efficiency, researchers append an efficiency term in an ad hoc basis to the NSPF, which
is then estimated using, mainly, the stochastic frontier technique. Building on Humphrey and
Pulley’s work, we show that such an approach, although intuitive, is algebraically incorrect and
therefore the specification of the NSPF is wrong.
Our paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we solve the bank’s profit maximization
problem using Humphrey and Pulley’s framework. Unlike Humphrey and Pulley, we explic-
itly introduce two potential sources of profit inefficiency: input inefficiency and output price
inefficiency. Then, we show that the bank’s profit maximization problem is equivalent to solv-
ing the nonstandard revenue maximization problem (Berger et al., 1996) and the standard cost
minimization problem, separately. That is, unlike the neoclassical profit function, the correct
NSPF specification is given by the difference between the nonstandard revenue function and
the standard neoclassical cost function in which parameters are completely different. Thus the
revenue and cost functions and inefficiencies thereform can be estimated separately from each
of them. The profit efficiency measure is shown to be a composite of both cost and revenue
efficiencies, and it can be computed without estimating the profit function. In fact, it would be
wrong to estimate the profit function because of the misspecification problem which we show
explicitly. That is, the efficiency measure used in the NSPF literature is incorrect because it
is estimated using an econometric model that is not consistent with the theoretical optimizing
model.
We demonstrate that banks’ profit efficiency is an overall measure of cost and revenue effi-
ciencies only if both input and output price inefficiencies are present — price efficiency affects
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revenues while input efficiency affects costs. Even if there is no revenue (cost) inefficiency,
profit efficiency is not the same as cost (revenue) efficiency. This result follows from the op-
timizing model used in the original NSPF framework and not from any special feature of our
modelling approach. Using the homogeneity properties of the nonstandard revenue function,
we also show that the NSPF is not linear homogeneous in input prices, contrary to the common
assumption made in the empirical literature.
We call our corrected measure the composite NSPF (CNSPF) efficiency measure to dis-
tinguish it from the traditional NSPF efficiency measure. The CNSPF decomposes profit effi-
ciency into revenue and cost efficiencies. From this decomposition, we can examine the relative
importance of improving revenue and cost efficiencies on profit efficiency.
In Section 3, we present the econometric model to estimate revenue and cost inefficien-
cies. We estimate revenue inefficiency using a nonstandard revenue function (NSRF, Berger
et al., 1996) and cost inefficiency using a standard cost function. Using revenue and cost
(in)efficiency estimates, we compute the CNSPF efficiency measure as the ratio between actual
and optimal profits without estimating a profit function.3
In Section 4, we describe the data used in the estimation and in Section 5 we present our
empirical results. We find that average revenue, cost, and profit efficiency estimates for U.S.
commercial banks are around 95%, 90%, and 80%, respectively. Forgone rents due to inef-
ficiencies amount to approximately 8% of banks’ equity. If banks were to eliminate revenue
inefficiencies, average profit efficiency would increase to 89% and forgone rents would de-
crease to 5%. On the other hand, if banks were to eliminate cost inefficiencies, average profit
efficiency would increase to 90% and forgone rents would decrease to 3%. Thus, cost effi-
ciency weighs more than revenue efficiency in estimated profit efficiencies. However, revenue
inefficiency affects more overall profitability. For example, a 1% increase in revenue (cost)
efficiency leads to a 2% (1%) increase in profit efficiency. This finding partially explains why
revenue efficiency is higher than cost efficiency.
3In addition, we can obtain estimates of the characteristics of the technology through the cost function (e.g.,
returns to scale, technical change, etc.) which is not possible from the NSPF because it does not satisfy the duality
results.
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2. Efficiency in the NSPF Framework
In this section, we model banks’ output price and input inefficiencies and show that the
econometric model used in the NSPF literature to estimate profit efficiency is misspecified.
Using the NSPF framework, we propose an alternative method that is free from this economet-
ric problem and allows researchers to investigate the relation among profit, revenue, and cost
efficiencies.
2.1. Modelling Efficiency in the NSPF Framework
In the NSPF framework, banks maximize profits,Π=∑m pmym−∑ j w jx j, by setting output
prices (pm ; m = 1, · · · ,M) and choosing input quantities (x j ; j = 1, · · · ,J). Output quantities
(ym) and input prices (w j) are taken as given. Output and input quantities are related through
the production possibility frontier that banks face which is defined in terms of a transformation
function, A f (y,θ · x;β ) = 1 where A is a productivity parameter, f (·) is the core transforma-
tion function, 0 6 θ 6 1 captures input inefficiency (also known as input-oriented technical
inefficiency), and β represents parameters of the transformation function. Output and input
prices are related through the price possibility frontier (PPF), g(p,w,z;α) = 1, where g(·) is a
functional form, z represents factors affecting banks’ price setting strategies (e.g., output level,
risk, etc.), and α represents parameters of the PPF.
The PPF is the distinctive feature of the NSPF framework. Humphrey and Pulley (1997)
posit the existence of a price opportunity set (POS) containing all feasible combinations of in-
put and output prices and other factors. The PPF is thus the frontier of the POS and contains
the highest feasible output prices given input prices and other factors that affect it. The PPF
constrains the relation among output and input prices and other factors included in z. According
to Humphrey and Pulley (1997, p.81), the PPF reflects the bank’s assessment of their compet-
itive position, customers’ willingness to pay for the bank’s products and services, and pricing
rules that the bank may follow, among other factors influencing banks’ price setting strategies.
However, Humphrey and Pulley did not specify how failing to set optimal prices (prices lying
on the PPF) contributes to banks’ profit efficiency through lower revenue.
Unlike Berger et al. (1996) and Humphrey and Pulley, we explicitly introduce price in-
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efficiency into the PPF.4,5 We measure output price efficiency by comparing observed output
prices with the highest feasible output prices (optimal prices) that are unobserved. We define
the optimal price vector as p∗ = η p, with η > 1. A bank is price efficient if η = 1. Price
inefficiency is the percentage shortfall of price from its optimal value (i.e., lnη = ln p∗− ln p).
Thus, price efficiency is given by 0 6 η−1 6 1 and measures how close p is to its optimal
value, p∗. The PPF becomes g(p∗,w,z,α) = 1 and the PPF frontier is g(p,w,z;α) = 1. Note
that since outputs are given, the presence of revenue inefficiency implies that observed output
prices are lower than optimal prices. This causes actual revenue to be less than optimal rev-
enue. The presence of revenue inefficiency (due to lower than optimal prices) can be tested
econometrically.
As we argued before, we explicitly model the missing connection between price and profit
efficiencies. We show below that output price efficiency (η−1) affects revenues, while input
efficiency (θ ) affects costs. Jointly, they affect profits. Without explicitly modeling output
price and input efficiency, the NSPF efficiency measure, as routinely estimated in the literature,
cannot be interpreted as an overall measure of cost and revenue efficiencies. More specifically,
the NSPF cannot be used to measure inefficiency no matter what the source of inefficiencies
are, price or input. This is shown in the next two sub-sections.
4Banks use three main pricing strategies: risk-based loan pricing, relationship-based pricing, and
relationship-lending pricing (see Berger and Udell, 2002; Edelberg, 2003; McCoy, 2007; Berger and Udell, 2006;
Cowan and Cowan, 2006; Gan and Riddiough, 2008; Dick and Lehnert, 2010; and Berger and Black, 2011).
However, the adoption of these strategies differ regarding banks’ characteristics (e.g., risk tolerance, geographic
diversification, bank size, loan portfolio, borrowers pool, among others.), competition, economic conditions, spe-
cific demand factors, and funding costs (see the Federal Reserve’s Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey on Bank
Lending Practices). These pricing strategies rely on difficult to observe borrowers characteristics and other vari-
ables that are outside banks’ control. The subjective nature of pricing strategies makes them complex and subject
to errors. Therefore, it is natural to assume that banks may err in setting optimal prices, and become price ineffi-
cient.
5Berger et al. (1996) consider the possibility that banks may fail to set prices to maximize revenues but focus
on economies of scope rather than on inefficiency. Koetter, Kolari, and Spierdijk (2012) consider a framework
in which banks with market power fail to set prices optimally. In their model, profit inefficiency arises since
the observed price function, or inverse demand function, is everywhere lower than the optimal price function.
Nonetheless, they use the traditional NSPF and do not explicitly estimate price inefficiency as we do in this paper.
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2.2. Solution of the Maximization Problem in the NSPF Framework
The Lagrangian associated with the profit maximization problem is:6
max
p,x
L =∑
m
pmym−∑
j
w jx j +λ [A f (y,θ · x;β )−1]+µ [g(η · p,w;α)−1] (1)
Defining p∗ = p ·η and x∗ = x ·θ , the first order conditions (FOCs) for pm and x j are:
ym+µ
∂g(p∗,w;α)
∂ p∗m
∂ p∗m
∂ pm
= 0 ∀ m : 1, · · · ,M. (2)
−w j +λ ·A∂ f (y,x
∗;β )
∂x∗j
∂x∗j
∂x j
= 0 ∀ j : 1, · · · ,J. (3)
From (2) we get:
pmym
p1y1
≡ p
∗
mym
p∗1y1
=
∂ lng(p∗,w;α)
∂ ln p∗m
∂ lng(p∗,w;α)
∂ ln p∗1
∀ m : 2, · · · ,M. (4)
Likewise, from (3) we get:
w jx j
w1x1
≡ w jx
∗
j
w1x∗1
=
∂ ln f (y,x∗;β )
∂ lnx∗j
∂ ln f (y,x∗;β )
∂ lnx∗1
∀ j : 2, · · · ,J. (5)
Since x∗j does not appear in (4) , we can solve for p∗m from (4) together with the price opportunity
set g(p∗,w;α) = 1 in terms of w, y˜, and the parameters of the PPF, i.e., η pm = p∗m = φm(w, y˜;α)
where y˜m = ym/y1. This expression relates optimal prices to output quantities and input prices.
Likewise, since p∗ does not appear in (5), we can solve for θx j = x∗j from (5) together with
the transformation function A f (y,x∗;β ) = 1 in terms of w˜, y and the parameters of the transfor-
mation function., i.e., θx j = x∗j = ψ j(w˜,y;β ) where w˜ j = w j/w1. This expression represents
6To ease the notation we drop z from the PPF. This is inessential for the results. Note that we do not require
output quantities to be included in the PPF. The relation between input prices and output quantities, in the spirit of
Berger et al. and Humphrey and Pulley, results naturally from the first order conditions of the profit maximization
problem. Further, in the simple output case, if the PPF depends directly on output quantities, there is no need
to solve the profit maximization problem to find out optimal prices. They could be derived directly from g(y,η ·
p,w) = 1. In addition, y can be included in z, anyway.
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the conditional factor demand functions.
These results follow from the fact thatL in (1) can be written as:
max
p,x
L = max
p
L1−minx L2 (6)
max
p
L1 = max
p ∑m
pmym+µ [g(η · p,w;α)−1] (7)
min
x
L2 = minx ∑j
w jx j−λ [A f (y,θ · x;β )−1] (8)
Note that (7) does not involve x and (8) does not involve p. Consequently, the optimization
problem in (6) splits into two separate optimization problems, viz., a nonstandard revenue
maximization problem in (7) and a standard cost minimization problem in (8). Since there are
no common parameters this result is true even under the assumption of full efficiency. That is,
the above result does not depend on any special feature of our modeling strategy.
The solutions of θx and η pm from (6) - (8) can be used to define the following:
max
p
L1 gives ∑ p∗mym =∑φm(w, y˜;α)ym = R(w,y;α) (9)
min
x
L2 gives ∑w jx∗j =∑w jψm(w˜,y;β ) =C(w,y;β ) (10)
max
p,x
L gives ∑ p∗mym−∑w jx∗j = R(w,y;α)−C(w,y;β ) (11)
The relationship in (11) is written as pi(w,y;α,β ) and is labeled as the NSPF which is given
by the difference between the nonstandard maximum revenue function (NSRF) R(w,y;α) in
(9), and the standard cost function (SCF) C(w,y;β ) in (10). Unlike the neoclassical revenue
function, the NSRF depends on input prices, output quantities, and the parameters of PPF. The
function C(w,y;β ) in (10) is a SCF which depends on input prices, output quantities, and the
parameters of the technology. If one writes pi(w,y;Θ) = R(w,y;α)−C(w,y;β ), and views it
as a profit function, its parameters cannot identify the α and β parameters from Θ. This is
because both the NSRF and the SCF are functions of the same variables but their parameters
are different. Consequently, the estimated parameters in the NSPF cannot be used to identify
either the transformation function or the PPF. Thus the NSPF has no economic meaning: there
are no duality results that can be drawn from it to know the features of either the transformation
8
function or the PPF. The neoclassical profit function, in contrast, does not separate additively
between the revenue and the cost functions because both are functions of the parameters of
the transformation function, β . In the neoclassical framework, going from the cost function
to the profit function requires maxy{∑m pmym−C(w,y;β )} which makes ym functions of the
same parameters β . Thus, profits are not the difference between maximum revenues R(p,x;β )
(obtained from maximizing revenue subject to the transformation function) and minimum costs
C(w,y;β ) (obtained from minimizing cost subject to the same transformation function). As we
show below, complete separability (in terms of parameters) of the NSPF explains why the
econometric model used in the literature to estimate NSPF efficiency is misspecified.7
2.3. Measuring NSPF Efficiency
Using (9) and (10), the relation among actual profit, maximum revenue, and minimum cost
is given by:
pia = Ra−Ca
=∑ pmym−∑w jx j
= (1/η)∑η pmym− (1/θ)∑w jθx j
= (1/η)∑φm(w, y˜)ym− (1/θ)∑w jψm(w˜,y)
= (1/η)R(w,y)− (1/θ)C(w,y)
(12)
where pia, Ra, and Ca stand for actual profit, actual revenue, and actual cost while R(w,y)
and C(w,y) represent maximum revenues and minimum cost, respectively. Thus, since η > 1
and 0 6 θ 6 1, actual revenues are a fraction of maximum revenues and minimum costs are a
fraction of actual costs. Thus, 0 6 η−1 6 1 is a measure of revenue efficiency and 0 6 θ 6 1
is a measure of cost efficiency.8 Then, actual profits are lower than optimal for two reasons:
actual revenues are lower than maximum revenues due to output price inefficiency, and actual
cost are higher than minimum costs due to input inefficiency.
7From now on we drop α and β from the nonstandard revenue and the cost functions to ease notational
complexity.
8Consider η = 4/3, actual revenues will be 75% of maximum revenues, Ra = (3/4)R(w,y). Thus, revenue
efficiency will be 75%. Now, If θ = 3/4, for example, minimum costs will be 75% of actual costs. Thus, a higher
value of θ indicates higher cost efficiency.
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Using (11) and taking the ratio between actual (pia) and maximum profits (pi∗), we get our
composite NSPF (CNSPF) efficiency measure:
γ(η ,θ) =
pia
pi∗
=
(1/η)R(w,y)− (1/θ)C(w,y)
pi∗
=
1
η
ω1+
1
θ
ω2 (13)
where ω1 = R(w,y)/pi∗ > 0 and ω2 =−C(w,y)/pi∗ 6 0 with ω1+ω2 = 1. Thus, (13) makes it
clear that our CNSPF efficiency measure can be decomposed into revenue efficiency (η−1) and
(the inverse of) cost efficiency (θ ) components, viz.,
1
η
ω1 and
1
θ
ω2. Profit efficiency, γ(η ,θ),
takes values in the unit interval if pia > 0 and is nondecreasing in revenue (∂γ/∂η−1 =ω1 > 0)
and cost efficiencies (∂γ/∂θ = −ω2/θ 2 > 0) .9 The result in (13) shows that one needs to
estimate the NSRF and cost function with inefficiencies to estimate profit efficiency. It is not
necessary to estimate the profit function.
In earlier studies, researchers estimate profit efficiency using a NSPF which does not cor-
respond to its theoretical counterpart given in (11). Rather, they attach a multiplicative effi-
ciency term to the NSPF to get pia = piNSPF(w,y)× γ , where piNSPF(w,y) is an estimate of the
NSPF and 0 6 γ 6 1 is a measure of profit efficiency (pia/ piNSPF(w,y)). However, accord-
ing to (12) the NSPF with inefficiency (1/η)R(w,y)− (1/θ)C(w,y) , piNSPF(w,y)× γ , unless
γ = 1/η = 1/θ . Since η > 1 and 0 6 θ 6 1, the equality γ = 1/η = 1/θ cannot hold. That
means, it is impossible to express actual profit pia as pia = piNSPF(w,y)× γ . So, the econo-
metric model used in the NSPF literature is misspecified. If banks are fully price efficient
pia = R(w,y)−(1/θ)C(w,y) = piNSPF(w,y)+(1−1/θ)C(w,y) , piNSPF(w,y)×γ , where 0≤ γ ≤ 1
is profit efficiency which does not depend on w and y. This shows that the NSPF is misspecified,
even when banks are full price efficient.
Alternatively, if banks are fully price efficient R(w,y) = Ra and we can rewrite pia as Ra−
Ca = Ra− (1/θ)C(w,y) which implies Ca = (1/θ)C(w,y). Thus one need to estimate only the
cost function to estimate input inefficiency. Similarly, if banks are input efficient, i.e., (θ = 1),
Ca =C(w,y) which implies that pia = Ra−Ca = (1/η)R(w,y)−C(w,y). This in turn implies
9If pia < 0, γ will be ill defined. In that case, other measures of profit inefficiency can be computed using equa-
tion (13). For example, we can define return on equity inefficiency as ROE∗−ROEa = (pi∗−pia)/Total Equity,
which measures the return on equity foregone due to both revenue and cost inefficiencies. This measure is well
defined as long as pi∗ > 0, which holds by the definition of maximum profits.
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that Ra = (1/η)R(w,y) and one needs to estimate only the NSRF to estimate price inefficiency.
In summary, there is no need to estimate a NSPF which can neither identify the sources of
inefficiency nor estimate the overall profit efficiency. If banks are only price (input) inefficient
then one needs to estimate only the NSRF (SCF) and estimate revenue (cost) efficiency.
It is clear from the above discussion that the correct approach to model inefficiency in a non-
standard profit maximizing model (as outlined in Humphrey and Pulley 1997) is to use both the
NSRF R(w,y;α) and the SCF C(w,y;β ) with inefficiencies but not the profit function as ad-
vocated in the literature. These two functions have no parameters in common and therefore,
separate estimation yields parameter estimates that are consistent with the theoretical optimiz-
ing framework underlying the NSPF. Inefficiency estimates from these two functions can be
used to estimate profit efficiency without estimating a profit function. The NSPF piNSPF(w,y;Θ)
is not consistent with the underlying optimization theory because it mixes parameters from two
different functions (the transformation function and the PPF). This problem does not arise in the
neoclassical framework since by duality theory the parameter estimates of the profit, revenue,
and cost functions are tied to a unique set of parameters of the transformation function.
One can use a misspecified model to estimate profit efficiency but as shown above, the
estimated γ from the misspecified model (pia = piNSPF(w,y)× γ) is not an estimate of profit effi-
ciency. Constraining γ to be in the interval (0,1) and interpreting it as profit efficiency might
give wrong relationship among profit, revenue, and cost efficiencies. For example, although
1/ηne1/θ , erroneously constraining γ = 1/η = 1/θ would imply that profit efficiencies are
negatively correlated with cost efficiencies but positively correlated with revenue efficiencies.
This is a common finding in the literature (e.g., Berger and Mester, 1997 and Rogers, 1998) and
it has been attributed to a negative correlation between revenue and cost efficiencies. Our em-
pirical results using the misspecified model confirm this intuition. However, using the correct
specification we show that despite a negative correlation between revenue and cost efficiencies,
profit efficiencies are positively correlated with both cost and revenue efficiencies.
In the following, we refer to the correct specification of the NSPF in (11) as the Composite
NSPF (CNSPF) because it separates into a NSRF and a cost function. We refer to its misspec-
ified version, piNSPF(w,y), as the NSPF. Further, we refer to profit efficiency estimates derived
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from the misspecified model as NSPF efficiencies. Likewise, we refer to η−1 as the NSRF
efficiency measure and θ as the cost efficiency measure.
Our CNSPF efficiency measure is linear in revenue efficiency and nonlinear in cost effi-
ciency. It allows us to disentangle the individual effects that revenue and cost efficiencies have
on profit efficiency. In addition, to compute CNSPF efficiencies, there is no need to estimate
a profit function. Only the estimation of the NSRF and the cost frontiers is required. Finally,
one can obtain estimates of the characteristics of the technology through the cost function (e.g.,
returns to scale, technical change, etc.).
From (13), we identify five fundamental sources of profit efficiency, ceteris paribus: i)
revenue efficiency, ii) cost efficiency, iii) shifts of the cost frontier, iv) shifts of the revenue
frontier, and v) shifts in the profit frontier — a combination of iii) and iv). Increases in NSRF
efficiency (↑ η−1) or in cost efficiency (↑ θ ) increase CNSPF efficiency (↑ γ). Downward shifts
of the NSRF frontier or upward shifts of the cost frontier increase CNSPF efficiency (↑ γ).
Upward shifts of NSRF and cost frontiers lead to upward shifts of the profit frontier if revenues
increases by more than the increase in costs. All these effects may lead to different relations
between CNSPF, NSRF, and cost efficiency estimates. In general, if the shifts of the frontiers
are small, one would expect a positive correlation between CNSPF and both NSRF and cost
efficiencies, regardless of the correlation between these two.
Note that (13) constrains the range of possible values that θ and η can take in relation
with γ . In Section 5, we show that NSPF efficiency estimates using the wrong specification
of the NSPF frequently violate this constraint. In contrast, our CNSPF efficiency measure, by
construction, is free from this problem.
2.4. Relationship among Profit, Revenue, and Cost Efficiencies
Our CNSPF efficiency measure in (13) allows us to analyze profit efficiency changes due to
changes in revenue, cost efficiency, or both. The ratio between proportional changes in CNSPF
efficiency due to revenue efficiency and proportional changes in CNSPF due to cost efficiency
is:
Λ=
∂ lnγ/∂ lnη−1
∂ lnγ/∂ lnθ
=
Ra
Ca
(14)
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Λ > 1 if Ra > Ca, i.e., pia > 0. This result indicates that revenue and cost efficiencies affect
profit efficiency asymmetrically. A given percentage increase in revenue efficiency has a greater
impact on profit efficiency compared to the same percentage change in cost efficiency, provided
that profits are positive. If profits are negative, the opposite is true.
Using (13) we can compute the percentage change in profit efficiency due to a one percent-
age change in revenue efficiency using ∂ lnγ(η ,θ)∂η−1 =
η−1
γ(η ,θ) ×ω1 > 0. Similarly, the percentage
change in profit efficiency due to a one percentage change in cost efficiency can be computed
using ∂ lnγ(η ,θ)∂θ = − 1γ(η ,θ) ×ω2 > 0. Thus, the percentage change in profit efficiency due to a
one percentage change in both revenue and cost efficiencies is [ 1γ(η ,θ) ][η
−1×ω1−θ−1×ω2].
Since ω1 and ω2 are bank-specific and also vary over time, these effects are bank- and year-
specific.
Another way of looking at this is to think of an equiproportional change in revenue and
cost efficiencies by x%. This is equivalent to a change in revenue and cost efficiencies by
k = 1+ x%. Denoting the new profit efficiency level by γ(k ·η−1,k · θ) and the proportional
change in profit efficiency by ∆%Γ(η−1,θ) = γ(k ·η−1,k ·θ)/γ(η−1,θ)−1, we have:
1+∆%Γ(η−1,θ) =
k
η
R(w,y)− 1
kθ
C(w,y)
1
η
R(w,y)− 1
θ
C(w,y)
(15)
If only revenue efficiency increases:
1+∆%Γ(η−1) =
k
η
R(w,y)− 1
θ
C(w,y)
1
η
R(w,y)− 1
θ
C(w,y)
(16)
If only cost efficiency increases:
1+∆%Γ(θ) =
1
η
R(w,y)− 1
kθ
C(w,y)
1
η
R(w,y)− 1
θ
C(w,y)
(17)
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Substituting (17) in (16):
1+∆%Γ(η−1) = k [1+∆%Γ(θ)] (18)
Equation (18) is the discrete counterpart of (14). Provided that pia > 0, a x% change in revenue
(cost) efficiency has a bigger (smaller) effect on profit efficiency. To see this note that k =
1+x%. If x%≷ 0, then k≷ 1, implying ∆%Γ(η−1)≷ ∆%Γ(θ). This result holds for any given
level of revenue and cost efficiencies. Thus, revenue efficiency gains are more important than
cost efficiency gains for improving overall profit efficiency.
Using (15), (16), and (17), is easy to show that ∆%Γ(η−1,θ) = ∆%Γ(θ) +∆%Γ(η−1),
indicating that proportional changes in profit efficiency are the sum of proportional changes in
profit efficiency due to revenue and cost efficiency changes.
We can also compute the marginal effects of determinants of revenue and cost inefficiencies
on profit inefficiencies. Suppose that revenue and cost inefficiencies are functions of a set of
variables z j, j = 1, ..J. We denote NSRF, cost, and CNSPF inefficiencies as lnη(z), − lnθ(z),
and − lnγ(z), respectively. Then, the marginal effect of a variable z j on CNSPF inefficiency,
∂ (− lnγ)/∂ z, is given by:
∂ (− lnγ(z))
∂ z j
=
1
pia
[
∂ (1/η(z))
∂ z j
R(w,y)+
∂ (1/θ(z))
∂ z j
C(w,y)
]
=
1
pi∗
[
∂ lnη
∂ z j
Ra+
∂ (− lnθ)
∂ z j
Ca
]
(19)
where ∂ lnη/∂ z and ∂ (− lnθ)/∂ z are the estimated marginal effects of z j on revenue and cost
inefficiencies.
2.5. Homogeneity Properties of the NSPF
In the neoclassical framework, the properties of the profit function follow solely from the
assumption of profit maximization. The reason is that the arguments of the neoclassical profit
function (input and output prices) do not enter into the transformation function. In contrast,
the arguments of the NSPF, input prices and outputs, enter into the transformation function
or the PPF. Thus, the properties of the NSPF depend crucially on the assumptions about the
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technology and the pricing opportunity set.
From the definition of R and the assumption that y does not enter into the PPF in (1), we
can establish that the NSRF is homogeneous of degree one in outputs. To see this, note that
R/y1 = p1 +∑m=2 p˜my˜m ≡ φ(w, y˜) since pm = φm(w, y˜). Further, φ(w, y˜) is homogeneous of
degree zero in y which means that R= y1φ(w, y˜) is homogeneous of degree one in y. If y enters
into the PPF, but the PPF is homogeneous of degree zero in y, R will still be homogeneous of
degree one in y. Otherwise, the NSRF would not be homogeneous in outputs.10
The next issue is whether the NSRF is linear homogeneous in input prices or not. We
argue that it is not. The NSRF would be linear homogeneous in input prices only if φm(w, y˜)
in (9) is linear homogeneous in w. That is, optimal output prices have to move in unison with
input prices. However, this assumption seems unrealistic given that most empirical studies find
evidence of incomplete pass-through of market rates to banks’ lending rates, specially in bank-
based financial systems (see Cottarelli and Kourelis, 1994, Berger and Udell, 1995, Berlin
and Mester, 1999, De Bondt, 2005, and Hofmann and Mizen, 2004).11 In addition, in the
Panzar and Rosse (1987) framework of competitive structure, the assumption that revenues are
homogeneous of degree one in input prices would correspond to the case of perfect competition;
which conflicts with the key assumption of imperfect competition of the NSPF framework.
The cost function is linear homogeneous in input prices, which implies that a proportional
increase in input prices yields an equiproportional increase in total costs. Since the NSRF is
linear homogeneous in outputs quantities but not in input prices, from (11) the NSPF is neither
homogeneous in input prices nor in output quantities. Therefore, we do not see any reasons for
researchers to impose linear homogeneity conditions on the NSPF because it goes against the
theoretical framework on which the NSPF is based. In the next subsection, and in our empirical
application, we show that imposition of the linear homogeneity condition on the NSPF might
distort the dynamics between profit and cost efficiency estimates.
10Note that in the end, pm and therefore R and/or Π are functions of y and w, no matters whether y appears in
the PPF or not.
11Loan rates adjust sluggishly to changes in funding costs, specially in bank-based financial systems. The
lending rates pass-through literature shows that banks shelter customers from funding rates shocks by smoothing
loan rates. For instance, Berger and Udell (1992) point out that loan interest rates may be sticky due to long-
term lending relationships or recontracting with financially distress borrowers. These contractual mechanisms
induce banks to hold interest rates relatively constant over time for commitment loans which have less asymmetric
information problems for banks.
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3. Econometric Estimation
To keep our results comparable to those in the literature, we estimate the NSRF, cost, and
NSPF frontiers using translog functional forms and follow the standard stochastic frontier esti-
mation procedure. The econometric specification of a typical stochastic frontier model is:
lnQit = f (lnyit , lnwit , t)+uit +υit (20)
υit ∼ N(0,σ2υ) (21)
uit ∼ N+(0,σ2it ) (22)
σ2it = exp(zitδ ) (23)
Depending on the frontier to be estimated, the left-hand-side variable of (20) will change (e.g.,
Qit is either total profits or total revenue or total costs for bank i at time t). Usually the variables
in the right-hand-side of (20) are outputs (y), input prices (w), and time (t).12 However, these
variables differ across the three specifications given that the NSPF, the NSRF, and the cost
function have different homogeneity properties. The cost function is homogeneous of degree
one in input prices, the NSRF is homogeneous of degree one in output quantities; and, as we
showed in Section 2, the NSPF is neither homogeneous in input prices nor in output quantities.
Therefore, in addition to the symmetry restrictions, we impose linear homogeneity of the cost
function by dividing total costs and all input prices by one of the input prices. For the NSRF,
we impose linear homogeneity by dividing total revenues and all outputs by one of the outputs.
In both cases, the choice of the normalizing variable is innocuous since they are mathematically
equivalent.
In the stochastic frontier model specified in (20) and (22), uit is a one-sided error term
typically assumed to be half-normally distributed with mean zero and variance σ2it . In our case,
uit =− lnηit 6 0, uit =− lnθit > 0, and uit = lnγit 6 0 for NSRF, cost, and NSPF inefficiencies
(see (12) and (13)). Finally, υit is a two-sided error term normally-distributed with mean zero
and variance σ2υ .13
12Following the literature, we include banks’ equity as an additional control variable (see Berger and Mester,
2003 and Wheelock and Wilson, 2012)
13See Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2003 for details on estimating stochastic frontiers. Distributional assumptions
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Following Caudill, Ford, and Gropper (1995), Hadri (1999), and Wang (2002), we assume
that the variance of the inefficiencies has the functional form given in (23), where δ is a vector
of parameter to be estimated and zit is a vector of bank characteristics that are of interest to
explain bank-specific inefficiency. Specifically, we include time and time squared to capture
the inefficiency trend over time; non performing loans (NPL) as an ex-post measure of credit
risk; the ratio of fees and loan income over total operating income as a measure of core income
from loans; a proxy for off-balance sheet activities (the ratio of non interest income over total
income) to capture the effect of nontraditional activities; the fraction of real estate loans over
total assets and the ratio of total loans over total assets as a measure of output mix, and the log
of total assets to control for bank size.
The parametrization of σ2it allows us to account for time varying determinants of inef-
ficiency via the zit variables (see Wang, 2002). In this setting, E[ui] = σit [φ(0)/Φ(0)] =√
2/pi exp(zitδ ), where φ and Φ are the probability and cumulative density functions of a
standard normal distribution, respectively. Therefore, the marginal effects of the z variables on
the unconditional mean of inefficiency are given by:
∂E[ui]
∂ zk
=
∂ (z′iδ )
∂ zk
√
(0.5/pi)exp(z′iδ ) (24)
To accommodate possible heteroscedasticity of the error term υit , we follow Hadri (1999) and
Wang (2003) and make σ2υ = exp(hitϕ); where hit is a vector of time and bank characteristics
that may induce heteroscedasticity in υit , and ϕ is a vector of parameters to be estimated. We
include time, NPL, and leverage in h. For all stochastic frontiers we estimate, we reject the
hypothesis of homoscedasticity at the 1% level of statistical significance.
4. Data
We use data from the Report of Conditions and Income (Call Reports) from the Federal
Reserve Bank of Chicago. We include all FDIC insured commercial banks with available
data between 2001Q1 and 2010Q4. We exclude banks reporting negative values for assets,
of these one-sided errors have little impact on estimated efficiency ranks (e.g., Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2003)
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equity, outputs and prices, standalone internet banks, commercial banks conducting primarily
credit card activities, and banks chartered outside continental U.S. territory. Our data set is an
unbalanced panel with 63,120 bank-year observations for 8,483 banks. We deflate all nominal
quantities using the 2005 Consumer Price Index for all urban consumption published by the
Bureau of Labor Statistics.
Table 1: Summary Statistics
Percentiles
Variable Mean sd 5th 25th 50th 75th 95th
y1 73,832 1,700,000 614 2,051 4,489 10,079 47,747
y2 361,000 5,310,000 5,697 20,471 49,531 121,000 554,000
y3 225,000 4,710,000 2,930 8,332 17,099 37,325 170,000
y4 300,000 7,980,000 4,558 13,205 26,858 57,704 256,000
y5 39,388 1,020,000 302 779 1,585 3,483 18,051
x1 227 3,437 9 19 36 76 302
x2 11,750 147,000 153 743 2,017 4,908 19,837
x3 300,000 6,710,000 2,512 8,935 21,451 52,966 279,000
x4 26,228 243,000 1,666 4,921 9,985 20,063 53,747
x5 552,000 10,900,000 10,849 25,726 49,863 116,000 600,000
w1 52.84 13.49 36.42 43.79 50.11 58.83 79.16
w2 0.348 0.342 0.103 0.167 0.242 0.388 0.968
w3 0.034 0.011 0.017 0.026 0.034 0.043 0.053
w4 0.010 0.007 0.002 0.005 0.008 0.014 0.025
w5 0.026 0.010 0.011 0.018 0.025 0.033 0.046
Π 33,795 598,000 643 1,776 3,510 7,723 37,021
R 73,325 1,290,000 1,771 4,299 8,245 17,790 81,558
C 39,530 751,000 979 2,401 4,673 10,027 44,623
Assets 1,070,000 20,900,000 25,303 59,017 115,000 247,000 1,110,000
NPL 0.009 0.015 0.000 0.001 0.005 0.011 0.033
Leverage 0.895 0.035 0.831 0.883 0.903 0.916 0.929
Offbal 0.059 0.066 0.008 0.022 0.040 0.072 0.167
Loan/Assets 0.663 0.144 0.395 0.575 0.683 0.768 0.863
Int.Ratio 0.703 0.131 0.459 0.630 0.721 0.796 0.882
REL/Loans 0.088 0.082 0.008 0.032 0.066 0.117 0.240
Equity 102,000 1,900,000 2,700 6,245 11,774 24,334 106,000
Notes: This table shows the average (Mean), standard deviation (sd), the median, and the 5, 25, 75, and 95th percentiles.
The data used for estimation include 63,120 year-bank observations for 8,483 banks with information for at least four
years between 2001 and 2010. Nominal values are in thousands of 2005 dollars. The output variables are: household and
individual loans (y1), real estate loans (y2), loans to business and other institutions (y3), federal funds sold and securities
purchased under agreements to resell (y4), and other assets (y5). The input variables are: labor quantity (x1), premises and
fixed assets (x2), purchased funds (x3), interest-bearing transaction accounts (x4), and non-transaction accounts (x5). For
each input x j its price, w j , is computed by dividing total expenses by the corresponding input quantity. Profits, Π, equals
revenues minus costs, R−C. Assets: Total Assets, NPL: Non Performing Loans, Leverage:Total liabilities/Assets, Offbal:
non interest income/ total income, Int. Ratio: Interest income/Total income, REL: Real estate loans, Equity: Total equity.
To estimate profit, revenue, and cost efficiencies, we must specify a model to map banks’
activities to output and input quantities and their corresponding prices. We follow the literature
and model banks’ activities using the balance-sheet approach of Sealey and Lindley (1977). In
this framework, a bank’s balance-sheet captures the essential structure of banks’ core business.
First, liabilities, together with physical capital and labor, are inputs into the bank production
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process. Second, assets, other than physical assets, are outputs. Liabilities are composed of
core deposits and purchased funds. Assets include loans and trading securities. Therefore,
banks use labor, physical capital, and debt to produce loans, invest in financial assets, and
facilitate other financial services.
Table 1 presents summary statistics for all the variables we use. Nominal variables are in
thousands. Output and input variables for each year are computed as the quarterly average of
balance-sheet nominal (stock) values. We define five output variables: household and individ-
ual loans (y1), real estate loans (y2), business loans (y3), securities (e.g. federal funds sold and
securities purchased under agreements to resell) (y4), and other assets (y5). These outputs are
essentially the same as those used in Berger and Mester (2003).
We define five input variables: labor (number of full-time equivalent employees at the end
of each quarter) (x1), physical capital (e.g., premises and fixed assets including capitalized
leases) (x2), purchased funds (federal funds purchased and securities sold under agreements to
repurchase, total trading liabilities, other borrowed money, and subordinated notes and deben-
tures) (x3), interest-bearing transaction accounts (x4), and non-transaction accounts (x5). For
each input x j its price, w j, is computed by dividing total expenses by the corresponding input
quantity. Total costs, C, equal the sum of expenses for five inputs; total revenues, R, equal
the sum of revenues for each output category; and, profits, Π, equal total revenues minus total
costs.
On the revenue side, real estate loans account for about 42% of total banks’ revenues, loan
to business and other institutions 16% , securities 15% , and other assets 16%. Loans to individ-
uals and households only account for 7% of total revenues. On the cost side, expenditures on
non-transaction accounts represent 29%, labor 41%, premises and fixed assets 10%, purchased
funds 17%, and transaction accounts 3% of total cost.
We include the following variables as possible determinants of inefficiencies: time, time
squared, log of total assets (Assets), non performing loans (NPL), leverage (Leverage:Total
liabilities/Assets), a proxy for off-balance sheet activities (Offbal: non interest income/ total
income), the ratio between interest income and total income (Int. Ratio), the ratio of real estate
loans (REL) over total assets, and total equity.
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5. Empirical Results
5.1. Efficiency Estimates
We summarize our main results in Table 2.14 Our proposed CNSPF efficiency measure in-
dicates that, on average, banks’ profits are 79.5% of their potential maximum. Average CNSPF
efficiency decreases with bank size. Big banks (assets > $1 billion) are more profit efficient
than medium ($100 million < assets < $1 billion), and small (assets < $100 million) banks.
The empirical distribution of CNSPF efficiencies is well behaved (see the top left plot of Figure
1) and its shape is similar to those that are usually found in the literature.
The second set of efficiency measures in Table 2 corresponds to NSPF efficiencies esti-
mated using the NSPF stochastic frontier. The results mirror those using the CNSPF approach.
Average NSPF efficiency is 80.8%, slightly higher than average CNSPF efficiencies. NSPF
efficiencies also indicate that big banks are more profit efficient than medium and small banks.
The density plot of NSPF efficiencies in Figure 1 shows that its distribution is similar to the dis-
tribution of CNSPF efficiencies. We further investigate the similarities and differences between
these two measures below.
The empirical distribution of NSRF efficiencies is clustered above 80% (see Figure 1), indi-
cating that NSRF efficiencies are high for most banks. Mean NSRF efficiency is 95.3%. NSRF
efficiencies are even higher for big banks. These results are robust to different specifications of
the NSRF frontier. For all of them, we reject the hypothesis of no revenue inefficiency.15 Table
3 shows that NSRF efficiencies are stable and slightly decreased over time (-0.74% from 2001
to 2010).
Cost efficiencies are also high with a mean value of about 90%. In contrast to profit and
revenue efficiencies, cost efficiencies are slightly higher for medium and small banks com-
pared to big banks. However, the differences are small. Table 3 shows that cost efficiencies
decreased from 2001 to 2004 and also in 2009, and increased in the other years. Overall, cost
14Table 2 in the supplementary material accompanying this paper presents the estimated parameters of the
NSPF, NSRF, and Cost stochastic frontiers.
15Formally, we test if the variance of the inefficiency term in equation (20) is zero, σu = 0. We use likelihood
ratio tests following Coelli and Battese (1996) and Wang (2003). Under the null hypothesis, these tests follow a
mixture Chi-squared distribution whose critical values are given in Kodde and Palm (1986, Table 1).
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Table 2: Summary Statistics for Estimated Efficiencies
Percentiles
Efficiencies mean sd 5th 25th 50th 75th 95th
CNSPF All banks 0.795 0.104 0.609 0.753 0.817 0.863 0.912
Big Banks 0.853 0.083 0.694 0.826 0.873 0.906 0.942
Medium Banks 0.807 0.098 0.633 0.770 0.829 0.870 0.915
Small Banks 0.773 0.108 0.581 0.728 0.795 0.845 0.897
NSPF All banks 0.808 0.113 0.597 0.768 0.830 0.878 0.939
Big Banks 0.870 0.092 0.714 0.827 0.885 0.936 0.978
Medium Banks 0.809 0.110 0.600 0.770 0.833 0.877 0.933
Small Banks 0.799 0.117 0.583 0.760 0.823 0.871 0.931
NSRF All banks 0.953 0.033 0.894 0.936 0.958 0.977 0.996
Big Banks 0.981 0.025 0.942 0.975 0.988 0.996 1.000
Medium Banks 0.960 0.030 0.907 0.946 0.965 0.981 0.996
Small Banks 0.942 0.034 0.883 0.924 0.946 0.965 0.989
Cost All banks 0.896 0.076 0.749 0.879 0.919 0.942 0.960
Big Banks 0.883 0.099 0.700 0.865 0.914 0.940 0.961
Medium Banks 0.901 0.075 0.766 0.886 0.922 0.944 0.962
Small Banks 0.893 0.075 0.740 0.874 0.916 0.939 0.958
CNSPF (No revenue ineff.) All banks 0.878 0.090 0.712 0.851 0.902 0.934 0.963
Big Banks 0.887 0.080 0.724 0.862 0.907 0.937 0.967
Medium Banks 0.882 0.084 0.727 0.856 0.903 0.934 0.963
Small Banks 0.873 0.097 0.694 0.842 0.900 0.934 0.963
CNSPF (No cost ineff.) All banks 0.892 0.090 0.740 0.858 0.910 0.951 0.991
Big Banks 0.959 0.055 0.867 0.945 0.976 0.992 1.000
Medium Banks 0.905 0.084 0.758 0.876 0.924 0.958 0.992
Small Banks 0.869 0.093 0.717 0.833 0.886 0.927 0.976
NSPFW (homogeneous in input prices) 0.807 0.128 0.565 0.757 0.832 0.890 0.961
Notes: This table shows the average (mean), standard deviation (sd), and the 5, 25, 50, 75, and 95 percentiles of the
estimated efficiency measures for all, big (assets > $1 billion), medium ($100 million < assets < $1 billion), and small
(assets < $100 million) banks. CNSPF efficiencies (Π/Π∗) are computed using equation (13). NSPF (γ), NSRF (1/η),
and cost (θ ) efficiencies are estimated using equation (20). No revenue inefficiency indicates that only cost inefficiency
is taken into account. Homogeneous in input prices indicates that the wrong assumption of linear homogeneity is
imposed. The data used for estimation include 63,120 bank-year observations for 8,483 banks. Profit efficiencies are
computed only from 62,577 observations for which profits are positive.
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Figure 1: Histogram and density plots for efficiency measures (see definitions and com-
putation in Table 2).
efficiency increased 1.55% from 2001 to 2010. We also find that CNSPF, NSPF, NSRF and
cost efficiencies are persistent over time.
To examine how cost and revenue efficiencies contribute to our CNSPF efficiency measure,
we report summary statistics for two additional measures of CNSPF efficiency in Table 2.
We compute CNSPF using equation (13) but with the assumption that there is no revenue
inefficiency (η = 1). Likewise, we compute CNSPF assuming that there is no cost inefficiency
(θ = 1). We find that if banks were fully revenue efficient, profit efficiency would increase, on
average, by 8.3 percentage points from 79.5% to 87.8%. The gains for big, medium, and small
banks would be 3.4, 7.5, and 10 percentage points, respectively. On the other hand, if banks
were fully cost efficient, profit efficiency would increase, on average, by 9.7 percentage points
from 79.5% to 89.2%. The gains for big, medium, and small banks would be 16.4, 9.8, and
9.6 percentage points, respectively. These findings suggest that cost inefficiencies weigh more
than revenue inefficiencies in estimated profit efficiencies.
For completeness, we present summary statistics of the traditional measure of profit effi-
ciency used in the literature. We also estimate the NSPF in (20) imposing the wrong assumption
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that the NSPF is linear homogeneous in input prices. We label it as NSPFW. The results are
similar to those without imposing the homogeneity restriction. However, they follow a different
pattern over time (see Table 3) and correlate differently with cost efficiencies (see Table 4).
The top right plot of Figure 1 shows that the empirical distribution of NSPF efficiencies is
similar to that of CNSPF efficiencies. The similarity between these two measures is surprising
given that they were obtained using different approaches. Common statistical tests reject that
both distributions are equal. Therefore, we further investigate if the small differences between
our CNSPF and NSPF efficiency estimates can lead to economically significant differences that
are relevant for empirical studies.
Quantile-quantile and empirical cumulative distribution plots (not reported) between NSPF
and CNSPF efficiency estimates reveals that both distributions have similar quantiles except
for those observations lying on the left tail of the distributions. Further, transition probability
matrices (not reported) show that CNSPF and NSPF efficiencies categorized by size deciles
are comparable. In summary, both efficiency estimates yield similar conclusions regarding
the efficiency level of big, medium, and small banks. However, both measures rank banks
differently.
Table 3: Mean Efficiency Measures
Year C-NSPF %∆ NSPF %∆ NSRF %∆ COST %∆ NSPFW %∆
2001 0.776 0.857 0.951 0.903 0.892
2002 0.796 2.58 0.840 -1.98 0.953 0.21 0.887 -1.77 0.870 -2.47
2003 0.801 0.63 0.819 -2.50 0.955 0.21 0.876 -1.24 0.848 -2.53
2004 0.806 0.62 0.806 -1.59 0.956 0.10 0.873 -0.34 0.831 -2.00
2005 0.807 0.12 0.807 0.12 0.957 0.10 0.889 1.83 0.803 -3.37
2006 0.794 -1.61 0.809 0.25 0.957 0.00 0.904 1.69 0.772 -3.86
2007 0.776 -2.27 0.797 -1.48 0.955 -0.21 0.909 0.55 0.748 -3.11
2008 0.779 0.39 0.775 -2.76 0.952 -0.31 0.910 0.11 0.736 -1.60
2009 0.798 2.44 0.773 -0.26 0.949 -0.32 0.909 -0.11 0.760 3.26
2010 0.817 2.38 0.780 0.91 0.944 -0.53 0.917 0.88 0.786 3.42
Total 0.795 5.280 0.808 -8.980 0.953 -0.740 0.896 1.550 0.807 -11.88
Notes: This table shows annual means of the estimated efficiency measures and their annual percentage changes.
NSPF stands for non standard profit function (traditional method), CNSPF correspond to Composite NSPF (our
method) computed using equation (13). NSRF refers to efficiency estimates from the non standard revenue function
and Cost to efficiency estimates using a cost function. NSRF efficiencies are computed as 1/η and Cost efficiency
as θ (See equation (20)). CNSPF efficiencies are computed using equation (13) as Π/Π∗. No revenue inefficiency
indicates that only cost inefficiency is taken into account. The data used for estimation include 63,120 bank-year
observations for 8,483 banks with information for at least four years between 2001 and 2010. Estimated profit
efficiencies are computed only from 62,577 observations for which profits are positive.
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The rank correlation coefficient between CNSPF and NSPF efficiency estimates is only
0.4437 with a standard error of 0.003 (see Table 4). In addition, the correlation between these
two measures and both NSRF and cost efficiency estimates differ markedly. For example,
the rank correlations of CNSPF efficiency with NSRF and cost efficiency estimates are 0.505
and 0.352, respectively. In contrast, the rank correlation between NSPF efficiency and cost
efficiency estimates is significantly negative (-0.293). Table 3 provides further evidence that
CNSPF and NSPF efficiencies are different. Overall, CNSPF efficiency increased by 5.28%
from 2001 to 2010. NSPF efficiency, in contrast, decreased by 8.98%. We think that these
differences are economically relevant for empirical studies.
Given that both CNSPF and NSPF efficiencies may lead to different conclusions, we advo-
cate using the CNSPF efficiency measure over the NSPF for two main reasons. First, the econo-
metric model used in the estimation of CNSPF efficiencies is correctly specified, as opposed
to the the one used to estimating NSPF efficiencies. Second, the CNSPF efficiency measure in
(13) clearly identifies the underlying sources of profit efficiency, which is not possible from the
NSPF. That is, one cannot identify the source of profit inefficiency from the estimated NSPF.
Equation (13) imposes constraints on the relation between cost, revenue, and cost efficien-
cies. In the NSPF approach, maximum profits (pi∗) equal maximum revenues, R(w,y), minus
minimum costs, C(w,y). For given levels of cost and profit efficiency, revenue efficiency can
be computed as Ra/R(w,y) = (pia +Ca)/(pi∗+C(w,y)). This relation helps in verifying the
consistency of different measures of cost, revenue, and profit efficiency. By construction, our
CNSPF efficiency measure always satisfies this relation. However, this is not the case for the
traditional NSPF efficiency measure. To show this, we compute the implicit revenue efficiency
values that are consistent with the estimated NSPF and cost efficiencies. That is, we use the
profit efficiency measures derived from the NSPF, along with the cost efficiency measures de-
rived from the cost function, and compute the implicit revenue efficiency measure. We find
that implicit revenue efficiency measures are higher than 100% for 22% of the observations.
This result implies that for some banks actual revenues are higher than the maximum possible
revenues. This exercise allows us to conclude that the traditional NSPF approach gives im-
plausible levels of revenue efficiency. In contrast, CNSPF efficiency measures are always well
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Table 4: Spearman Rank Correlation Coefficients
CNSPF NSPF NSRF COST NSPFW RTS
NSPF 0.4437
(0.0036)
NSRF 0.5050 0.5196
(0.0035) (0.003)
COST 0.3521 -0.2930 -0.3174
(0.0037) (0.0038) (0.0038)
NSPFW 0.2694 0.8629 0.4210 -0.4428
(0.0038) (0.0016) (0.0036) (0.0039)
RTS 0.0374 -0.1466 -0.1252 0.0438 -0.1897
(0.0040) (0.0040) (0.0040) (0.0040) (0.0039)
TC -0.0761 0.0903 -0.1366 -0.1261 0.1947 0.3309
(0.0040) (0.0040) (0.0040) (0.0039) (0.0039) (0.0038)
Notes: This table shows the sample Spearman rank correlations between different es-
timated efficiency measures, returns to scale (RTS) and technical change (TC). Stan-
dard errors are into parenthesis. All correlations are statistically different from zero
at the 99% confidence level. NSPF stands for non standard profit function (traditional
method), CNSPF correspond to Composite NSPF (our method) computed using equa-
tion (13). NSRF refers to efficiency estimates from the non standard revenue function
and Cost to efficiency estimates using a cost function. NSRF efficiencies are com-
puted as 1/η and Cost efficiency as θ (See equation (20)). NSPFW denote efficiency
estimates imposing homogeneity restrictions on the NSPF. The data used for estima-
tion include 63,120 bank-year observations for 8,483 banks with information for at
least four years between 2001 and 2010. Estimated profit efficiencies are computed
only from 62,577 observations for which profits are positive.
behaved by construction.
5.2. Relationship among Profit, Revenue, and Cost Efficiencies
We compute forgone rents as a fraction of banks’ total equity due to inefficiencies. Table
5 presents the results. Forgone rents due to profit inefficiency amount to 8.2% of banks equity.
The second and third panels in Table 5 shows that 3.5 percentage points of forgone rents are
due to revenue inefficiency and 4.7 percentage points due to cost inefficiency. Based on average
annual equity for all banks during the sample period, we estimate that forgone rents due to cost
and revenue inefficiencies are about $31.5 and $23.5 billion, respectively. Therefore, contrary
to previous studies, we find that the actual levels of banks’ profitability are more affected by
cost inefficiency than by revenue inefficiency.
Forgone rents for big, medium, and small banks are 7.1%, 7.7%, and 8.8%, respectively. If
banks were fully cost efficient, forgone rents would decrease to 1.5%, 3.1%, and 4.2% for big,
medium, and small banks. The corresponding values would be 5.6%, 4.6%, and 4.7% if banks
were fully revenue efficient.
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Table 5: Summary Statistics for Forgone Rents due to Inefficiency
Percentiles
Forgone rents due to: mean sd 5th 25th 50th 75th 95th
Revenue and cost inefficiencies
All Banks 0.082 0.061 0.031 0.051 0.070 0.097 0.162
Big Banks 0.071 0.073 0.020 0.036 0.052 0.081 0.178
Medium Banks 0.077 0.060 0.030 0.049 0.066 0.090 0.152
Small Banks 0.088 0.058 0.034 0.057 0.077 0.106 0.170
Revenue inefficiency
All Banks 0.035 0.025 0.003 0.017 0.031 0.047 0.080
Big Banks 0.015 0.021 0.000 0.003 0.009 0.019 0.047
Medium Banks 0.031 0.023 0.003 0.015 0.027 0.042 0.071
Small Banks 0.042 0.026 0.008 0.025 0.039 0.055 0.089
Cost inefficiency
All Banks 0.047 0.058 0.011 0.021 0.033 0.054 0.120
Big Banks 0.056 0.073 0.010 0.022 0.036 0.063 0.162
Medium Banks 0.046 0.060 0.011 0.022 0.034 0.053 0.117
Small Banks 0.047 0.054 0.011 0.021 0.033 0.054 0.120
Notes: This table shows the average (mean), standard deviation (sd), and the 5, 25, 50, 75, and 95
percentiles of the estimated forgone rents as a fraction of banks’ total equity due to inefficiencies
for all, big (assets > $1 billion), medium ($0.1 < assets < $1 billion), and small (assets < $0.1
billion) banks. The data used for estimation include 63,120 bank-year observations for 8,483 banks.
Forgone rents are computed only from 62,577 observations for which profits are positive.
Now, we estimate the effect of a 1% increase in revenue, cost, or both efficiencies on CN-
SPF efficiency. For each bank, we multiply its NSRF and cost efficiency scores by 1.01. Then,
we compute the percentage change in CNSPF efficiency due to the change in NSRF efficiency
using (16), the change in cost efficiency using (17), and changes in both NSRF and cost effi-
ciencies using (15). Table 6 reports the results.
For all banks, a 1% increase in NSRF efficiency leads to an average increase of 2.64% in
CNSPF efficiency. The same increase in cost efficiency leads to an average increase of 1.62%
in CNSPF efficiency. Thus, for any given level of efficiency, increasing revenue efficiency has
a greater impact on profit efficiency than increasing cost efficiency. This result is consistent
with our general finding that, on average, banks are highly revenue efficient. Over the years,
banks may have realized that improving revenue efficiency or avoiding revenue inefficiency
has a greater impact in overall profitability than improving cost efficiency or eliminating cost
inefficiency.
A simultaneous increase in both NSRF and cost efficiencies by 1% leads to an increase in
CNSPF efficiency by 4.26%, on average. Small banks experience bigger gains than medium
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banks, and medium banks have bigger gains than big banks. Considering a 1% decrease, in-
stead, we find similar results.
Table 6: ∆% in CNSPF efficiency due to a 1% Change in NSRF and Cost Efficiencies
Percentiles
Due to 1%∆ in: mean sd 5th 25th 50th 75th 95th
All Banks
NSRF Efficiency 2.63679 5.84964 1.69016 1.98710 2.26739 2.65642 3.80156
Cost Efficiency 1.62059 5.79173 0.68332 0.97733 1.25485 1.64002 2.77382
Both 4.25738 11.64137 2.37348 2.96443 3.52224 4.29644 6.57537
Big Banks
NSRF Efficiency 2.24624 0.89011 1.60804 1.87737 2.12209 2.45668 3.16247
Cost Efficiency 1.23390 0.88130 0.60202 0.86869 1.11098 1.44225 2.14106
Both 3.48015 1.77141 2.21006 2.74606 3.23307 3.89893 5.30353
Medium Banks
NSRF Efficiency 2.60303 4.34329 1.71204 2.02260 2.30241 2.68706 3.80529
Cost Efficiency 1.58716 4.30028 0.70499 1.01247 1.28951 1.67035 2.77752
Both 4.19018 8.64357 2.41704 3.03507 3.59192 4.35741 6.58281
Small Banks
NSRF Efficiency 2.72576 7.51504 1.68162 1.96570 2.24319 2.64215 3.89412
Cost Efficiency 1.70867 7.44063 0.67487 0.95614 1.23088 1.62589 2.86546
Both 4.43443 14.95567 2.35649 2.92185 3.47408 4.26805 6.75958
Notes: This table shows the average (mean), standard deviation (sd), and the 5, 25, 50, 75, and 95 per-
centiles of the percentage change in profit efficiency measures if revenue and cost efficiency estimates,
or both, were shifted up by 1% for all, big (assets > $1 billion), medium ($0.1 < assets < $1 billion),
and small (assets < $0.1 billion) banks. The data used for estimation include 63,120 bank-year obser-
vations for 8,483 banks. Forgone rents are computed only from 62,577 observations for which profits
are positive.
We repeat the previous exercise but instead of computing the change in profit efficiencies,
we compute the change in returns on assets (ROE). The results are reported in Table 7. We
find that a 1% increase in revenue efficiencies would yield a 0.79 percentage points increase in
ROE. That is, ROE will increase from an average of 10.91% to 11.70%. From a 1% increase in
cost efficiencies, ROE will increase by 0.38 percentage points to 11.29%, on average. From a
1% increase in both revenue and cost efficiencies, ROE will increase by 1.17 percentage points
to 12.08%, on average. This effect is the sum of the two separate effects of revenue and cost
efficiencies on ROE.
Similar to the effects of cost and revenue efficiencies on profit efficiency, the effect of
revenue efficiencies on ROE is stronger than the effect of cost efficiency on ROE. The gains in
ROE from a 1% simultaneous increase in revenue and cost efficiencies are similar for big and
medium banks, but smaller for small banks.
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Table 7: Percentage Points Change in ROE due to a 1% Change in NSRF and Cost Efficiencies
Percentiles
mean sd 5th 25th 50th 75th 95th
ROE (%)
All banks 10.91051 25.92201 -6.08869 7.38383 12.46615 17.51077 26.17512
Big Banks 14.76771 20.26284 -7.27529 10.43905 17.26188 22.67688 32.28473
Medium Banks 11.75311 29.51609 -5.71353 8.64264 13.74273 18.57407 27.14227
Small Banks 9.43269 21.57637 -6.32208 6.17151 10.66172 15.20543 23.20761
Due to 1%∆ in: All Banks
NSRF Efficiency 0.79324 0.29200 0.39350 0.60486 0.76898 0.94638 1.26778
Cost Efficiency 0.38288 0.14706 0.17122 0.27830 0.36831 0.46863 0.64719
Both & cost shift 1.17612 0.41706 0.57597 0.89319 1.14249 1.41161 1.88499
Big Banks
NSRF Efficiency 0.84281 0.30576 0.38806 0.64713 0.81729 1.00167 1.36699
Cost Efficiency 0.38515 0.14902 0.16294 0.28386 0.37212 0.46873 0.66060
Both & cost shift 1.22795 0.42665 0.56690 0.95017 1.19502 1.46378 1.98574
Medium Banks
NSRF Efficiency 0.81056 0.29860 0.42125 0.62983 0.78506 0.95408 1.27069
Cost Efficiency 0.39965 0.14704 0.18506 0.29700 0.38552 0.48370 0.66533
Both & cost shift 1.21021 0.41772 0.61839 0.93658 1.17830 1.43466 1.90973
Small Banks
NSRF Efficiency 0.76661 0.27978 0.36962 0.57271 0.73848 0.92803 1.25085
Cost Efficiency 0.36285 0.14432 0.15989 0.25876 0.34676 0.44778 0.62249
Both & cost shift 1.12945 0.41037 0.54107 0.83897 1.09275 1.37137 1.84414
Notes: This table shows the average (mean), standard deviation (sd), and the 5, 25, 50, 75, and 95 percentiles
of returns on equity (ROE) (first panel) for all, big (assets > $1 billion), medium ($0.1 < assets < $1 billion),
and small (assets < $0.1 billion) banks. It also presents summary statistics of the increase in ROE when,
revenue, cost, or both type of efficiency estimates are shifted up by 1%. The data used for estimation include
63,120 bank-year observations for 8,483 banks. Forgone rents are computed only from 62,577 observations
for which profits are positive.
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Now, we explore the effect of some bank characteristics (determinants of inefficiency) on
revenue, cost, and profit efficiencies. We parameterize the unconditional variance of the inef-
ficiency term for the NSPF, NSRF, and cost frontiers following Wang (2002) (see (23)). The
estimated parameters are presented in Table 8. The sign of each parameter gives the direction of
the marginal effects of the corresponding variable on the unconditional mean of inefficiencies.
We compute the marginal effects using (24) for each inefficiency measure. Table 9 presents the
results in elasticity form.16
Table 8: Parameter Estimates of the Variance of Inefficiency for NSPF, NSRF, and Cost
Stochastic Frontiers
NSPF NSRF Cost Function
Variable Parameter Std. Err. Parameter Std. Err. Parameter Std. Err.
t 0.160 0.027 -0.238 0.053 0.281 0.071
t2 -0.022 0.005 0.048 0.011 -0.062 0.018
NPL 12.26 0.589 11.80 1.283 15.95 1.437
Int. Ratio 5.624 0.231 5.462 0.573 -5.308 0.328
Offbal -3.623 0.281 -31.75 1.631 6.620 0.353
RSL/Assets -12.34 0.637 -5.824 0.601 3.955 0.414
Loans/Assets -5.188 0.218 -8.174 0.5767 0.427 0.281
lnAssets -0.206 0.009 -0.176 0.017 -0.171 0.015
Log Likelihood -15,303.679 27,730.598 28,669.082
Obs. 62,579 63,120 63,120
Notes: This table shows the estimated parameters of the variance of inefficiency for the three translog
stochastic frontiers: NSPF, NSRF, and Cost (see (20)). NPL: Non Performing Loans. Leverage equals
total liabilities over total assets. Int. Ratio: Interest ratio equals total interest income from loans over total
income. Offbal: off balance-sheet activities equals total non interest income over total income. REL: Real
estate loans. Assets: Total assets.
The marginal effect of time on CNSPF inefficiencies shows an average decline of 3.2% per
year from 2001 to 2010. NSRF and cost inefficiencies also decrease 1% and 0.2% per year,
respectively. In contrast, NSPF inefficiencies increase on average by 0.5% per year.
As expected, NPL has a positive effect on inefficiencies. A 10% increase in NPL contributes
to a 0.9% increase in CNSPF inefficiency, 0.57% increase in NSRF inefficiency, and 0.9%
increase in cost inefficiency.
The marginal effect of interest ratio weighs heavily on NSRF and cost inefficiencies. A
10% change in interest ratio a yields 21% decrease in cost inefficiency and a 20% increase
in NSRF inefficiency. These two effects offset each other to yield a slightly negative effect
16Although these marginal effects are observation-specific, we are reporting the mean values and their standard
deviation to conserve space. Details are available from the authors upon request.
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Table 9: Marginal Effects of Bank Characteristics on Inefficiency Estimates
Inefficiency Measures
CNSPF NSPF NSRF COST
Variable mean s.d. mean s.d. mean s.d. mean s.d.
Time -0.022 0.153 0.005 0.008 -0.010 0.008 -0.002 0.022
NPL 0.064 0.654 0.056 0.352 0.057 0.101 0.090 0.644
Interest ratio -0.037 1.234 2.488 1.205 1.994 0.504 -2.101 1.003
Off balance-sheet activities -0.080 1.983 -0.128 0.149 -0.954 1.054 0.268 1.651
Real estate loans 0.001 0.567 -0.630 0.551 -0.265 0.250 0.209 0.439
Loans/Assets -1.117 0.916 -2.158 1.041 -2.807 0.728 0.161 0.116
Assets -0.082 0.081 -0.129 0.052 -0.092 0.016 -0.098 0.078
Notes: This table shows the mean and standard deviation of the estimated marginal effects (in elasticity form
except for time) on inefficiency of time and banks’ characteristics: non performing loans (NPL), interest
ratio (Interest and fee income on loans / Total income), off balance-sheet activities, real estate loans over
total assets, total loans over assets, and banks’ size (assets) on estimated inefficiencies. CNSPF: Composite
NSPF, NSPF: non standard profit function, NSRF: non standard revenue function, COST: cost function.
The variance of the inefficiency term is parametrized following Caudill et al. (1995), Wang (2002), and
Schmidt (2011) as exp(z′iδ ) with z being a vector of time and banks’ characteristics. The marginal effects
on inefficiency of the associated variables are computed using (24). The marginal effects on CNSPF are
computed using (19).
on CNSPF efficiency. Banks with relative high off-balance sheet activities tend to be more
cost inefficient and less revenue inefficient. Overall, the marginal effects of off-balance sheet
activities on revenue and cost inefficiencies offset each other and generate a small negative
effect on CNSPF efficiency. Banks with a higher concentration on real estate loans are also less
revenue inefficient and more cost inefficient. The overall effect on CNSPF efficiencies is small.
Banks with a large loan portfolio relative to total assets tend to be less revenue inefficient
but more cost inefficient. A 10% change in loans to total assets ratio leads to a 28% (11.17%)
reduction in revenue (CNSPF) inefficiencies. Finally, a 10% change in total assets would lead
to a 0.10% decrease in CNSPF profit inefficiency.
Overall, the marginal effects on CNSPF inefficiency capture the joint dynamics of the
marginal effects on revenue and cost inefficiencies. In contrast, the effects on NSPF ineffi-
ciency seem to be entirely due to the marginal effects on revenue inefficiencies. Since NSPF
efficiencies are estimated using a misspecified model, NSPF efficiencies may confound the rev-
enue and cost efficiency effects. More importantly, note that the estimated NSPF is likely to be
biased because it is misspecified. Consequently, estimated NSPF inefficiencies are likely to be
incorrect, and a comparison of NSPF and CNSPF inefficiencies might be wrong.
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5.3. Homogeneity Restrictions on the NSPF
For estimation, researchers often impose the restriction that the NSPF is homogeneous of
degree one in input prices (e.g. Berger and Mester, 1997, Altunbas, Evans, and Molyneux,
2001, Clark and Siems, 2002, Berger, Hasan, and Zhou, 2009, Koetter et al., 2012). In most
cases, the authors state that their results are unaffected by such restrictions. Humphrey and
Pulley (1997, p.81, 84) explicitly state that the NSPF is not linear homogeneous in input prices
and Kumbhakar (2006) formally proves this point. In Section 2, we showed that the same
results holds in our framework.
We find that imposing linear homogeneity in input prices is not innocuous. As shown in
Table 4, the rank correlation between NSPF and cost efficiencies—labeled NSPF and COST,
respectively, is −0.293. The rank correlation between NSPFW and cost efficiency is signif-
icantly lower (−0.4428). The difference between them is statistically significant and might
be economically significant in empirical studies. For example, studies usually take profit and
cost efficiencies and draw conclusions depending on how they correlate with other variables.
Imposing wrong homogeneity restrictions may lead to misleading results.
6. Conclusions
Research on bank’s profit efficiency using the nonstandard profit function sprang after the
publication of Humphrey and Pulley (1997). Since then, more than fifty published studies
have contributed significantly to the current stock of knowledge regarding some aspects of the
evolution of the banking industry over the last three decades. In this paper we show that the
econometric model used in the literature to estimate Humphrey and Pulley’s model is misspec-
ified. Using the same theoretical framework, we propose an alternative method that solves this
problem and allows researchers to study the contribution that both revenue and cost efficiencies
have on overall banks’ profit efficiency.
Our empirical results indicate that the measured levels of bank’s profit efficiency are influ-
enced more by cost inefficiencies than by revenue inefficiencies. We estimate the combined
annual losses for all U.S. commercial banks due to cost and revenue inefficiencies at about
$31.5 and $23.5 billion, respectively. We demonstrate theoretically and show empirically that
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changes in revenue efficiency have a greater impact on profit efficiency than equivalent changes
in cost efficiency; a result consistent with the measured high levels of revenue efficiency we
present.
Our alternative method allows us to investigate the relation between profit, revenue, and
cost efficiencies across banks and over time. We find that revenue and cost efficiencies tend to
be negatively correlated, but both correlate positively with profit efficiency. As suggested by
Berger and Mester (1997), the negative correlation between revenue and cost efficiencies may
indicate that less cost efficient banks offset their related losses with higher revenue efficiency.
Perhaps because less efficient banks incur higher costs in producing higher quality outputs that
bring in higher revenues or because high revenue efficient banks exert less effort in controlling
costs. In contrast to the results obtained using the misspecified econometric model, we find that
profit and cost efficiencies tend to be positively correlated. Thus, the negative relation between
cost and profit efficiencies reported in the literature (e.g., Rogers 1998 and Berger and Mester
1997) stems from misspecification of the econometric model which, as we show, implicitly
constraints profit and cost efficiencies to be negatively correlated.
Using U.S. commercial bank data from 2001 to 2010, we find that revenue and cost effi-
ciency estimates are around 95% and 90%, respectively; leading to an overall profit efficiency
level of about 80%. Big banks are more revenue efficient than medium, and small banks. How-
ever, average cost efficiency levels are similar across the bank size distribution, except for the
very small banks. Profit inefficiency represents about 8.15% of bank equity of which 3.49% is
due to revenue inefficiencies and 4.66% due to cost inefficiencies. For big, medium, and small
banks average forgone rents are 7.1%, 7.7%, and 8.8% of banks’ equity, respectively.
If banks were fully revenue efficient, profit efficiency would increase from 79.5% to 87.8%.
If banks were fully cost efficient, profit efficiency would increase from 79.5% to 89.2%. A 1%
increase in revenue efficiency would increase profit efficiencies by 2.64%. In comparison, the
same increase in cost efficiencies would increase profit efficiencies by only 1.6%. Thus, for
any given level of cost and revenue efficiencies, revenue efficiencies weigh more than cost
efficiencies in overall profit efficiency.
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